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Meehl, P.E.: The selfish voter paradox and the thrown-away vote argument. Mackenzie, D.: Making sense out of consensus. Lehtinen, A.: The welfare consequences of strategic behaviour under approval and plurality voting. Laslier, J.-F.: The leader rule a model of strategic approval voting in a large electorate. (eds.) Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 14–18 July Bellevue, Washington, USA. Public Choice 59(2), 121–131 (1988)īrânzei, S., Caragiannis, I., Morgenstern, J., Procaccia, A.D.: How bad is selfish voting? In: desJardins, M., Littman, M.L. Birkhauser, Boston (1983)īrams, S.J., Fishburn, P.C., Merrill, S.: The responsiveness of approval voting: comments on Saari and van Newenhizen. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.Īrrow, K.J.: A difficulty in the concept of social welfare. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. We also bound the improvement and degradation of outcome quality under both types of behaviors. We show perhaps counter-intuitively that being more generous with your time can lead to inferior time slots being selected, and being more protective of your time can lead to superior time slots being selected. Via theoretical worst-case analysis, we analyze certain common behaviors of Doodle poll respondents, including when participants are either more generous with or more protective of their time, showing that deviating from one’s “true availability” can have a substantial impact on the overall quality of the selected time. Yet group dynamics can markedly influence an individual’s response, and thus the overall solution quality. Web-based Doodle polls, where respondents indicate their availability for a collection of times provided by the poll initiator, are an increasingly common way of selecting a time for an event or meeting.
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